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REcENT DECISIONS

llS

FEDERAL PRoCBDURE-RBMoVAL DENIED TO lMPLEADBD PARTY UNDER 28
U.S.C. 144l(c)-Plaintiff sued to recover indebtedness of $7000, to foreclose a chattel mortgage, and to enjoin a local bank from permitting the
accounts of the debtor to be withdrawn. Defendant then filed a crosscomplaint, as authorized by state procedure, against a third party nonresident
garnishee to recover damages for breach of contract and money owed in the
sum of $35,000.1 The cross-defendant removed the case to the United States

1

The garnishee's connection with the original action is not disclosed by the facts.
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district court. Held, although the cross-complaint stated a separate and independent cause of action, it could not be the basis of removal since 28 U.S.C.
§1441 (c) 2 contemplates only the removal of claims joined by the plaintiff.
Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, (D.C. Ark. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 680.
Prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. §1441 (c), the "separable controversy''
provision of 28 U.S.C. §71 8 was interpreted by many courts to allow removal
at the petition of nonresident intervenors and nonresident cross-complainants
when the diversity and amount in controversy requirements were met. Removal was consistently granted at the petition of a new party who was not
involved in the original proceeding, who was brought in by cross-bill or
cross-complaint, and as against whom the original defendants sought affirmative
relief, if the controversy removed could be fully determined between the original
defendant and the third party defendant.4 Removal of a separable controversy
at the petition of a nonresident intervenor was allowed providing the intervenor's claim was adverse to that of the original plaintiff or to the claim of
all or some of the original plaintiffs and defendants.5 It was generally denied
if the intervenor claimed under or was subrogated to the rights of the original
plaintiff,6 if he sought primarily to enforce his own claim and only incidentally
to oppose that of the original plaintiff,7 if he appeared only to protect the rights
of the original defendant, 8 or if the remaining defendants were necessary
parties to the controversy whose removal was sought.9 It appears then that
under section 71 a litigant was often considered to be a defendant within the
intendment of the removal act although not named as such at the inception
of the suit. The principal case, however, indicates that under _section 1441 (c)
a "separate and independent claim or cause of action" may be removed only
at the petition of a defendant who is named as such at the commencement
of the suit. Yet a federal district court in New York,10 subsequent to the enact2 28 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §1441 (c): "Whenever a separate and independent
claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one
or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand
all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction."
s 28 U.S.C. (1940) §71: " ••• And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be
fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually
interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the United
States.•••"
4 Habermel v. Mong, (6th Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 822, 280 U.S. 587, 50 S.Ct. 37;
Consolidated Textile Corporation v. Iserson, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 294 F. 289.
5 Bronson v. St. Croix Lumber Co., (C.C. Minn. 1888) 35 F. 634.
G Chicago v. Gage, (C.C. ill. 1875) 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,664, affd. sub nom. Ayers v.
Chicago, 101 U.S. 184 (1879); Nash v. McNamara, (C.C. Nev. 1906) 145 F. 541.
7 In re San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co., (C.C. Tex. 1890) 44 F. 145.
s Bronson v. St Croix Lumber Co., supra note 5.
OThom Wire Hedge Co. v. Fuller, 122 U.S. 535, 7 S. Ct. 1265 (1887); see First
National Bank v. Merchants' Bank, (C.C. Ga. 1888) 37 F. 657 (removal allowed by nonresident intervenor where original defendant was only a nominal party).
10 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Associates, (D.C. N.Y.
1949) 81 F. Supp. 739.
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ment of the present statute, permitted the removal of a separate claim to a
federal court by an impleaded third party. Removal was allowed because
diversity existed between the original defendant and the third party defendant
and because the controversy between them was wholly separate and distinct
from that stated in the pleadings between the original parties. It would seem
that that court in reaching this result ignored the phrase "is joined" in section
144l(c), which was interpreted to mean, even before the principal case,
joined in the original complaint.11 Since the right to remove is purely statutory,12 and since the Supreme Court has declared that courts by interpretation
should not defeat the purpose of Congress to limit removal jurisdiction,13 it would
seem likely that the principal case rather than the New York case will be
followed, with the result that section 144l(c) will not be construed to include
claims other than those contained in the plaintiff's complaint
Robert G. Russell, S.Ed.

11 Snow
12 Great

v. Powell, (10th -Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 172.
Northern R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 38 S. Ct. 237 (1918); Bradley
v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., (D.C. Okla. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 913.
IS American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534 (1951).

